We have previously argued in dozens of writings on Turkey’s future, its historical transformation, imitation and models, and modernization efforts that the biggest problem—even in works of art—has been top-down change. The concern for modernization within institutions in Turkey is still dominant. So what has been the position of institutions in the historical process? We organized a text by asking artificial intelligence.
Executive
Most sultans were modernizers. If we consider that Abdulhamid II—often labeled as reactionary—established modern educational institutions that even trained his greatest opponents, and that Atatürk, who held more power than any sultan, even banned some forms of music he personally liked, we can say that the executive has been the driving force of modernization. This may not remain so in the future. Social media, populist leaders, and postmodern and postcolonial discourses may reverse this momentum.
Legislature
Divans and councils were the earliest institutions reflecting the will of the people into governance. Later came the Senate (Ayan Meclisi) and the Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan), and finally the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. However, due to the military-hierarchical nature of the culture and the fact that national sovereignty remained largely a discourse of secondary interest groups at the center, a truly independent legislative institution could not fully emerge. The public is disengaged from legislative processes, does not know its representatives, and does not take part in civil society. Therefore, even a legislature that could have resisted modernization has often aligned itself with the government. In the future, as democratic awareness increases, this may change. Independent individuals who genuinely attempt to act as representatives may raise awareness through social media.
Judiciary
The judiciary, one of the least trusted institutions in Turkey, continues to fail to convince the public. Judging by comments under news articles, those most satisfied with court outcomes seem to be criminals. At the same time, forced modernizers have historically used the judiciary as a tool. The fact that sultans issued decrees and law codes—unprecedented in Islamic tradition—shows that even religious law was subordinated to the government. Like the legislature, the judiciary has been heavily influenced by governments and has not been internalized by society, becoming an instrument in the hands of modernizing leaders. In the future, it may improve somewhat with the support of artificial intelligence.
Education
Although education has always been controlled by the executive, its outputs have often worked against governments. Since Mahmud II, educated individuals have tended to oppose authority, question power, and criticize the education system itself. Due to its exposure to global developments and its structural adoption from the West, the education system has been inherently more progressive. The fact that its core structure does not fully align with the ideology of the executive, and that students and staff often hold oppositional views, supports this claim. In the future, it is likely to develop further through remote learning and access to foreign sources.
Military
During the imperial period, the military was often conservative, but in the modernization period it became a leading force for modernization. Whenever sultans attempted reforms, soldiers would revolt. In the Republican era, whenever the executive deviated from a modernization agenda, the military intervened. This transformation stems from the fact that the first acknowledgment of backwardness occurred on the battlefield, followed by the first translations, model changes, and reforms within the military. Since soldiers have been educated according to Western models—and alternatives often resulted in defeat—it can be said that the military’s modernizing role is unlikely to change in the near future.
Media
Imported officially from the West into a country without a strong readership base, the media has continued to imitate Western models and seems likely to keep doing so in the digital age. Unlike in Europe, state-centered media dominates. Because opposition media is unfamiliar, dissent is often perceived as abnormal or even criminal. Social media, however, may offer an opportunity for journalism. Its role as a core element of democracy may become more widely recognized alongside other institutions.
Religion
Religion has consistently tried to act as a counterbalance to modernization, yet the executive power—from the sultans to the present—has rarely taken it into account. Some of the harshest revolutions in the world were carried out in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. These were often implemented despite religion, disregarding the ulema, and failing to properly consider public sentiment. Those accused of bringing religion into politics have often done so opportunistically rather than out of genuine religious conviction. The limited influence of religion in politics reflects the uncompromisingly modernizing stance of both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
Civil Society
Turkey, as a “military nation,” is inclined toward militaristic socialization and paternalism. The dominance of the center over the periphery and a cultural affinity for strong leaders hinder the development of civil society. People tend to wait for a leader to act and, as a consequence, do not strongly oppose top-down policies. Associations, scientific academies, and societies established for modernization often struggle to attract participants. Public seminars and conferences receive little interest. However, social media communities and platforms have been more successful. It can be said that civil society will improve further with the help of technology.r, are more successful. We can say that civil society will continue to improve thanks to technology.
